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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jason Rowland appeals from the district court's order that denied his motion

The district court summarized the facts and procedures underlying Rowland's
conviction for felony possession of methamphetamine as follows (with bracketed
references to the suppression hearing transcript and exhibits):
A search warrant was executed at the Defendant's residence on
November 2, 2013 in the evening. [2/27/14 Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.2i 1
Officer Teresa Thiemann and Officer Justin Bekker testified at the
motion to suppress hearing. They participated in executing the search
warrant. [Tr., p.6, L.18; p.6- p.7, L.2; p.20, Ls.19-24.]
Officer Thiemann was the first officer to make contact with the
Defendant upon arriving at the residence. [Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.2.]
She was also the officer who signed an affidavit in support of the
application for the search warrant.
[11/4/13 Affidavit of Teresa
2
Thiemann. ] The search warrant commanded the search of 529
California Street as well as of persons for various property, including a
chainsaw, drug paraphernalia, Methamphetamine, and Marijuana.
[11/4/13 Search Warrant, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A.]
Upon arrival, Thiemann went downstairs and found the
Defendant in a bedroom. [Tr., p.7, L.21 - p.8, L.19; p.14, Ls.7-11.]
She handcuffed him, escorted him up the stairs, and handed him off to
another officer outside the door. [Tr., p.8, L.20 - p.9, L.16.] Officer
Bekker conducted the search prior to the Defendant's arrest. [Tr.,
p.21, L.7 - p.22, L.6; p.28, L.13 - p.29, L.5.] Officer Bekker testified
that he was unsure whether the Defendant was merely being detained

In the interest of brevity, all subsequent citations to the February 27, 2014
suppression motion hearing will be to "Tr."
On February 20, 2015, this Court granted Rowland's motion to augment the record
to include the Affidavit of Teresa Thiemann and the Search Warrant, file-stamped
November 4, 2013. (2/20/15 Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record.)
2
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or had actually been arrested. [Tr., p.28, Ls.17-20.] A baggie with a
white powdery substance was found in the Defendant's pocket. [Tr.,
p.22, Ls.2-6.]
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and Motion to
Dismiss on February 6, 2014. [R., pp.108-112.]

Teresa Thiemann testified at the motion to suppress hearing on
February 27, 2014 regarding the events that occurred on November 2,
2013. [Tr., p.6, Ls.2-24.] Thiemann is a patrol officer with the City of
Gooding, and she has been employed by the Gooding City Police
Department for 9 years. [Id.] On November 2, 2013, Thiemann issued
and executed a search warrant at the Defendant's residence. [Tr., p.6,
L.18 - p.7, L.2.] She knew it was the Defendant's residence because
she has known the Defendant for 9 to 10 years, and he has always
lived at the residence. [Tr., p.11, Ls.9-19.] Moreover, she had contact
with the Defendant at the residence approximately 2 to 3 weeks prior.
[Tr., p.11, Ls.20-23.] The execution of the warrant occurred in the
evening while it was dark outside. [Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.3.]
Upon arrival, some officers went to the front of the house, and
some officers went to the rear of the house. [Tr., p.7, Ls.7-9.]
Thiemann secured a door on the side of the house. [Tr., p.7, Ls.9-11.]
She heard footsteps inside the house, and then she entered the house.
[Tr., p.7, Ls.16-22.] The door opened up into a stairwell with stairs
going up and stairs going down. [Tr., p.12, Ls.15-18.] There was one
room at the bottom of the stairs, and this room was below ground. [Tr.,
p.12, Ls.19-25.] The stairs going up led to the main floor. [Tr., p.12,
Ls.1-2.]
Thiemann went downstairs, and it took her approximately 30
seconds to arrive at the bottom of the stairs. [Tr., p.13, Ls.3-7.] It was
dark, but she used a flashlight. [Tr., p.14, Ls.4-6.] The stairs were
covered with various items including clothing, stereos, wiring, tools,
and other things. [Tr., p.13, Ls.8-20.] A computer tower was at the top
of the steps. [Tr., p.8, Ls.5-1 O.] Thiemann had to step on things as
she walked downstairs, and it was noisy. [Tr., p.13, Ls.21-25.] There
were also items piled at the bottom of the stairs. [Tr., p.14, Ls.1-3.]
She saw chainsaw parts and a case, and the chainsaw was one of the
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items listed in the search warrant.f31 [Tr., p.8, Ls.6-16.] As she walked
down the stairs, she yelled "search warrant." [Tr., p.14, Ls.16-22.]
Thiemann entered the bedroom at the bottom of the stairs and
made contact with the Defendant. [Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.8, L.2.] Upon
making contact with the Defendant, she asked him to place his hands
in the air. [Tr., p.8, Ls.20-24.] He complied, and then she asked him
to place his hands behind his back. [Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.1.] After
she handcuffed him, she escorted him back upstairs and handed him
off to a deputy. [Tr., p.9, Ls.10-16.] She told the deputy that the
Defendant had not yet been patted down or checked for weapons.
[Tr., p.9, Ls.20-22.] She testified that she told the deputy to conduct a
patdown of the Defendant. [Tr., p.16, Ls.11-18.] She did not actually
see the deputy's face, but she saw his arm and observed that he was
in police uniform. [Tr., p.9, Ls.12-18; p.16, Ls.3-6.] The landing had
items in it on the floor, so there was only enough room for one person
to go through the door. [Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16, L.2.]
Thiemann testified that the Defendant was not under arrest at
this point, as they were just securing everyone in the residence. [Tr.,
p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.4.] She testified that she knew that they were
go'ing to arrest the Defendant; however, he was not under arrest at that
point. [Tr., p.17, Ls.2-4.] She knew he was going to be arrested
because she stepped over the chainsaw that was described as stolen
property in the search warrant. [Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.2.] He was
only being detained at that point. [Tr., p.17, Ls.2-4.]
She then made contact with her supervisor and continued
searching the residence. [Tr., p.10, Ls.1-4.] During the search, she
found drug paraphernalia, a white powdery substance, and a green
leafy substance in an upstairs room. [Tr., p.10, Ls.5-9.]
Thiemann transported the Defendant to jail and told him he was
under arrest for possession of paraphernalia, possession of a white
powdery substance, and possession of stolen property. [Tr., p.10,
Ls.14-25.]

3

Officer Thiemann testified that as officers continued to search Rowland's
residence, presumably after Officer Bekker found a clear bag of methamphetamine
in Rowland's front left pocket, they matched the serial number of the chainsaw on
the stairs with the serial number of the stolen chainsaw. (Tr., p.8, Ls.6-16; p.10,

Ls.1-13; p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.6.)
3
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Justin Bekker testified at the motion to suppress hearing on
February 27, 2014 regarding the events that occurred on November 2,
2013. [Tr., p.20, Ls.13-21.] Bekker is a reserve police officer with the
Gooding County Police Department. [Tr., p.20, Ls.17-18.] Bekker
assisted with the search of the Defendant's residence, and he testified
that they found drug paraphernalia and stolen items. [Tr., p.21, Ls.715.]
Bekker was the third person to enter the house. [Tr., p.21, Ls.710; p.23, Ls.12-23.] He entered through the front door. [Id.] He saw
two men, and he told them to lie down on the ground. [Tr., p.25, Ls.1521.] He handcuffed the men and searched them. [Tr., p.25, Ls.21-22.]
He conducted what he referred to as a Terry search which involved
taking everything out of the pockets to be sure there was nothing that
could hurt him. [Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.14; p.27, Ls.8-11.]
After the inside of the house was secured, Bekker went outside.
[Tr., p.27, L.20 - p.28, L.1.] Another officer asked Bekker if he would
pat down the Defendant or search him to make sure he did not have
any weapons. [Tr., p.28, Ls.4-7.] Bekker was not present outside
when Thiemann handed the Defendant over to another officer. [Tr.,
p.28, Ls.8-1 0.] Bekker testified that he was unsure if the Defendant
had been detained or had been arrested, so he conducted what he
referred to as a Terry search. [Tr., p.28, Ls.17-23.] Bekker interacted
with the Defendant for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. [Tr., p.21,
Ls.16-18.] Bekker felt the Defendant's belt and did not feel anything
metal. [Tr., p.29, Ls.1-21.] Bekker searched the Defendant and found
money in his left front pocket, and he found a clear bag with a white
powdery substance inside it. [Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.6.]
(R., pp.125-128, pp.2-5 of District Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's
Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss, attached as Appendix B.)
The state charged Rowland with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia, with a persistent violator
enhancement. (R., pp.45-50.) Rowland moved to suppress the evidence seized as
a result of the search of his person, conducted during the execution of a search
warrant at his residence.

(R., pp.108-112.)

Following a hearing on Rowland's

suppression motion, the district court held that the search of Rowland's person was

4
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justified as a search incident to lawful arrest, and denied the motion. (R., pp.124134.) Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Rowland pied guilty to possession
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and the state did not pursue the
paraphernalia or persistent violator charges.

sentenced Rowland to seven years with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction
for one year. (R., pp.154-161.) Rowland timely appealed. (R., pp.168-171.)
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(R., pp.145-151.) The district court
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ISSUE
Rowland states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rowland's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Rowland failed to show error in the district court's order denying
Rowland's motion to suppress evidence?

6
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Rowland Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Denying Rowland's
Motion To Suppress Evidence

I
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Introduction
The district court denied Rowland's motion to suppress, ruling that the search

of his person was permitted (1) by the terms of the search warrant, and (2) as a
search incident to lawful arrest. (R., pp.124-134.)
Rowland challenges the district court's decision, first arguing that the search
of his person was not within the scope of the warrant to search "the above described
premises and persons." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-14.)

Next, Rowland contends the

officers did not have probable cause to arrest him by seeing the chain saw (and
case) in the residence, without first comparing the serial number of the chainsaw
with the stolen chainsaw's serial number. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-20.)
Rowland's arguments fail.

The terms of the search warrant authorize the

search of persons described in the warrant, and Rowland is clearly described in the
warrant.

Next, when Officer Thiemann entered Rowland's residence and walked

down the stairs, she instantly recognized the chainsaw as stolen property, giving her
probable cause to arrest Rowland of possessing such property. Finally, as Rowland
acknowledges on appeal,

under the inevitable discovery exception to the

exclusionary rule, "even had Officer Bekker not (impermissibly) searched Re.
Rowland when he did, Mr. Rowland would eventually have been arrested for
possession of stolen property and searched incident to his arrest."
Brief, p.8.)

7

(Appellant's

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

u
I
I
I
I
I
I
.
I

B.

Standard Of Review
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court

accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence,
but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v.
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

Because The Search Warrant Authorized A Search Of Rowland, He Is Not
Entitled To Suppression Of The Evidence Found As A Result Of The Search
Rowland contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress,

claiming "the search warrant was for a residence only and did not allow for any
persons to be searched [and] [i]t is not possible to reconcile the search warrant with
the district court's finding of fact because there were no persons identified by the
search warrant." (Appellant's Brief, p.9 (emphasis original); see also id., p.11 ('The
search warrant in this case did not authorize the search of Mr. Rowland, and in fact
the search warrant did not authorize the search of any persons - the warrant was
only for the search of a residenc~.").)
Rowland further states, "[t]he actual search warrant is contained in the first
three paragraphs, and describes the premises to be searched, and the property to
be searched for."

(Appellant's Brief, p.11; see 11/4/13 Search Warrant, pp.1-2.)

Rowland excuses, as mere boilerplate language, the search warrant's seminal
command that officers "search the above described premises and persons[,]"
claiming such language "is a reference to the premises." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.)
Rowland does not explain how a "commonsense reading" (see id.) of the phrase
"and persons" is a reference to "premises." Instead, and presumably in reliance on

.

.
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his trimmed-down view of the "actual" search warrant, Rowland asserts there were
"no 'persons' specifically identified and described in the warrant as those to be
searched pursuant to the warrant." (Id.)
Search warrants are "not subject to technical drafting requirements and
should be interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion." State v. Young, 136
Idaho 711, 715, 39 P.3d 651, 655 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Holman, 109 Idaho
382, 388, 707 P.2d 493, 499 (Ct. App. 1985)); see also United States v. Johnson,
541 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8 th Cir. 1976) (noting the standard to be used in determining
the adequacy of descriptions contained in a search warrant "is one of practical
accuracy rather than technical nicety"). When evaluating the validity of a warrant,
the court may consider "the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant,
the contents of the search warrant, and the circumstances of the search." United
States v. Robinson, 358 F.Supp.2d 975 (D. Mont. 2005).

Application of the

foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case demonstrates that the search
warrant issued in this case authorized a search of Rowland's person.
Rowland's contention that "[t]he actual search warrant is contained in the first
three paragraphs" is not well-taken. In essence, Rowland is incongruously saying
that only the first three paragraphs of the search warrant is the search warrant. Not
only does Rowland ignore the fact that the entire four-page document is entitled
"SEARCH WARRANT" (see 11 /4/13 Search Warrant, Appendix A), he has failed to
provide any legal authority to support his assertion that a search warrant cannot
include statements by an affiant within the body of a search warrant.
Appellant's Brief, pp.11-14.)

(See

Therefore, Rowland has waived his argument on
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appeal, and this Court should decline to consider it. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 257,
263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (declining to address argument as a result based on
established principle that "[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or
argument is lacking"). Contrary to Rowland's argument, the district court correctly
concluded that the search warrant authorized the search of Rowland:
The search warrant specifically mentions the Defendant. Officer
Thiemann, in her sworn affidavit, stated that Jeremy Larson informed
her that he took the stolen chainsaw to the Defendant's house. Larson
told Thiemann that the Defendant offered to pay him $150.00 if he took
the chainsaw to 529 California Street in Gooding, Idaho.
The
chainsaw was described in the warrant as a Stihl chainsaw that was
orange and white in color with an orange case. The serial number was
·
also included in the search warrant.
The search warrant authorized a search of 529 California Street
as well as a search of the Defendant's person for the items described
in the warrant which included the chainsaw, Methamphetamine,
Marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.
(R., p.131.)

The district court was correct. The search warrant, which included averments
from Officer Thiemann's supporting affidavit, commanded officers "to search the
described premises and persons for the property described" and to seize such
property if found -

including, inter alia, marijuana, methamphetamine, drug

trafficking paraphernalia, and a stolen orange and white Stihl chain saw in an orange
case (serial number 282877540). (11 /4/13 Search Warrant, pp.1-4.)
warrant, signed by a judge on November 2, 2013, stated:

The search

(1) Rowland was an

occupant of the house to be searched, 529 California Street in Gooding; (2) Officer
Thiemann had information about a chainsaw that had been stolen - it was "made by
Stihl and that the serial number is 282877540 and that is orange and white in color
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and that it was in an orange case[;]" (3) a man recently arrested by Officer
Thiemann, Jason Larson, admitted he had stolen the chain saw and delivered it to
Rowland's residence after Rowland "told him that if he brought it to him he would
give him $150.00[;]" (4) Larson said he had last seen the chainsaw at Rowland's
residence on October 31, 2013 (two days prior to the search warrant's signing and
execution); (5) Larson knew there were drugs in Rowland's house because
"Rowland had weighed Meth on a silver scale Halloween night[,]" and the scale
showed the substance weighed "6.2", although Larson was unsure if it was ounces
or grams; and (6) Larson also told Officer Thiemann "that he had seen Marijuana in
the home during that same time as well." (Id., pp.1-3.)
Contrary to Rowland's argument, he was repeatedly identified in the search
warrant, not only by name and with his place of residence, but with his criminal
activity that related directly to the items sought to be found in the search warrant especially methamphetamine and the Stihl chain saw.

Contrary to Rowland's

argument, the search warrant's command to search "the above described "persons"
could only have been in reference to Rowland, as Larson was obviously an
"informant" who had been arrested, and Rowland was the only other non-law
enforcement officer mentioned in the warrant.

Rowland has failed to meet his

burden of showing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
based on this argument.

11
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Correct Application Of The Law To The Facts Shows Law Enforcement Had
Probable Cause To Arrest Rowland For Felony Possession Of Stolen
Property
"Warrantless arrests made upon probable cause do not violate the Fourth

Amendment." State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 349, 194 P.3d 550, 553 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008)). "Probable cause for an
arrest is not measured by the same level of proof required for conviction."
Chapman, 146 Idaho at 351, 194 P.3d at 555 (citation omitted). Rather, probable
cause only "requires that the police possess information that would lead a person of
ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion
that a crime has been committed by the arrestee." State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho
137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).

The probable

cause determination "depends upon the totality of the circumstances and the
assessment of probabilities in the particular factual context." Finnicum, 147 Idaho at
140, 206 P.3d at 504 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003)). The
facts upon which the probable cause finding is based are evaluated objectively and
must take into account the officers' expertise and experience. Finnicum, 147 Idaho
at 140, 206 P.3d at 504 (citing State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d
1059, 1062-63 (1996)); Chapman, 146 Idaho at 351, 194 P.3d at 555 (citing State v.
Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 323, 824 P.2d 894, 898 (Ct. App. 1991)).
Rowland has failed to meet his burden of showing the district court erred
denying his motion to suppress. As correctly summarized by the district court below,
the evidence presented in relation to Rowland's suppression motion established
facts that, viewed in their totality, support the district court's conclusion that law
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enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest Rowland for felony possession of
stolen property.

(See Statement of Facts, supra (with citations to the record).)

Rowland challenges the district court's finding of probable cause, arguing that the
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officers did not have probable cause to arrest him for a crime until after Officer
Bekker searched him. (Appellant's Brief pp.18-19.) Rowland argues:
The district court held that the presence of a chainsaw in the
house was sufficient probable cause to arrest Mr. Rowland for
possession of stolen property; however, such was error. A chainsaw is
a relatively common tool that may be found in a residence and is not
so unique an item as to instantly be recognizable as contraband.
Many homes have chainsaws, and the presence of chainsaw parts,
where the warrant identified a Stihl brand chainsaw, does not, in and of
itself, constitute probable cause to believe this was the chainsaw the
thief described, particularly where Officer Thiemann testified that she
had not yet verified the serial number on the chainsaw parts match that
of the stolen chainsaw.
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)
Rather than repeat the well-reasoned arguments set forth in the district court's
Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss
(R., pp.124-134), the state hereby adopts the district's court's memorandum decision
and incorporates them by reference herein. For this Court's convenience, a copy of
the district court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion to Suppress and
Motion to Dismiss, is attached to this brief as Appendix B. The state further supports
the district court's analysis with the following comments.
"In ascertaining whether probable cause exists, a magistrate is justified in
drawing reasonable inferences from the facts stated in support of the issuance of the
search warrant." State v. Sorbel, 124 Idaho 275, 278, 858 P.2d 814, 817 (Ct. App.
1993) (citing State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 688 P.2d 1203 (Ct. App. 1984)).
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Although Rowland states that "[a] chainsaw is a relatively common tool that may be
found in a residence" (Appellant's Brief, p.19), a reasonable inference from Officer
Thiemann's testimony is that she instantly recognized more detail of the chainsaw
than suggested.
At the suppression motion hearing, Officer Thiemann was asked why, during
the search, she believed Rowland was going to be arrested. (Tr., p.17, Ls.21-22.)
She answered, "Due to the fact that I had already stepped over the chain saw that
had been described to us as the property that we were looking for." (Tr., p.17, L.25
- p.18, L.2 (emphasis added).)

It is reasonable to infer that Officer Thiemann

observed that the chainsaw she stepped over on the stairs fit the description given
for the stolen chainsaw in the search warrant -- including its colors (orange and
white) and brand name ("Stihl"). (See 11/4/13 Search Warrant, pp.1-2; see also Tr.,
p.18, Ls.6-8 (when asked what kind of chainsaw she was talking about, Officer
Thiemann said, "We're talking about a steel [sic] chain saw").)
Considering the reasonable inference that the description of the stolen
chainsaw (sans its serial number) that officers had probable cause to believe was in
the house matched the chainsaw seen by Officer Thiemann on the stairs both in
brand and color, the district court properly concluded that the search of Rowland
was justified by the existence of probable cause to arrest him for possession of the
stolen chainsaw.

I
I

I
I
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E.

Even If The Search Of Rowland Was Not Proper Pursuant To The Warrant Or
The Probable Cause Exception, The Evidence In Rowland's Pocket Would
Have Inevitably Been Discovered
Assuming that the search of Rowland's pocket was not properly included as

part of the premises or did not fall within the probable cause exception, exclusion of
the evidence discovered therein would be improper under the inevitable discovery
doctrine. See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812-813
(Ct. App. 2002) (inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary
rule). The state sought application of the inevitable discovery doctrine in the event
the district court found the search otherwise improper. (R., p.130 (see Appendix A);
Tr., p34, L.19 - p.35, L.9.) Even though the district court did not base its decision on
this ground, this Court may affirm the result on that theory. McKinney v. State, 133
Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931
P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997).
Where the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of proof that the
evidence at issue inevitably would have been found by lawful means, then exclusion
of the evidence is improper even if it was actually obtained by constitutionally
improper means.

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart v. State, 136

Idaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001). The underlying rationale of this
rule is that suppression should leave the prosecution in the same position it would
have been absent the police misconduct, not a worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44;
Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 102, 57 P.3d at 813.
While still conducting a search of Rowland's residence, officers were able to
match the serial number of the chainsaw that was located on the stairs with the

15

serial number of the chainsaw reported stolen.

(Tr., p.8, Ls.6-16; p.10, Ls.1-13;

p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.6.) At that point, law enforcement officers undoubtedly would
have had probable cause to arrest Rowland for possession of the stolen chainsaw,
and, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the clear bag of methamphetamine
found in Rowland's pocket would not have been subject to exclusion. Based on the
inevitable discovery doctrine, the district court correctly denied Rowland's motion to
suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search of his person.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Rowland's motion to suppress evidence.
DATED this

th day of May,

2015.

C. McKINNEY
puty Attorney Gen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this th day of May, 2015, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing file stamped
copies addressed to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

. McKinney
ty Attorney Genera
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APPENDIX A
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF TI-IEf]

I
I
I
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I
I
I

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Got9tMJ/&-4

IN THE MATTER OF THE
APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH
WARRANT.

)
)
)
)
)
)

. ."

M1,

':

€it

SEARCH WARRANT

t 3- tr -- (

COUNTY OF GOODING:
THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL OR
POLICEMAN IN THE COUNTY OF GOODING
1. The following location/s: A dwelling located at 529 California Street in the City of
Gooding, County of Gooding and State of Idaho, the dwelling is tan in color with brow;1
trim with the front door located on the face of the house facing East.

2.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

I

For the following property: Marijuana, Meth, drug trafficking paraphernalia along with ar.y
implements, and paraphernalia used in the sale, and use of Marijuana or Meth, including:, but
not limited to scales, zip lock baggies, paper bindles, photograpts, sifters, ledger books or
other sheets memorializing the sale of any controlled substances, all apparent
instrumentalities or items evidencing the same, packaging materials, records, utility recelpt~,
envelopes, letters, keys and other indicia of control, ownership, to-wit A dwelling located at
529 California street in the City of Gooding, County of Gooding and State of Idaho, the
dwelling is,,~ in color with brown trim with the front door located on the face of the

..

·,

residence facing East. The numbers 529 California located on the n9rth side of the front
door.

3. Jeremy Todd Larson told me that he had stolen a chain saw and that he dropped it off with
Jason Rowland located at 529 California Street. The information that we have received on

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

the chain saw made by Stihl and that the serial number is 282877540 and that it is orangt;:
and white in color and that it was in an orange case.

That the affiant' s belief is based upon the following facts and drcumstances:
1.

searching him prior to placing him in my patrol car for transport I did a pat down. I found a
brown glass bottle that had white crystal like residue in it, through my training and
experience I believe the residue to be methamphetamine. The residue was later tested using
a NIK (Narcotics Identification Kit) with the residue testing presumptively positive for
Methamphetamine. There was also a glass pipe with residue in it located in his right front
pocket, through my training and experience I know this to be i:, smoking device used to
smoke methamphetamine. He was also a suspect on a theft that had occurred in the pr.st.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Today I did an interview with Jeremy Todd Larson that committed an unlawful entry Upon

While I was interviewing Jeremy Larson he told me that he had stolen the item in que:,tion
and that he placed it at 529 California Street located in the city of Gooding, County of
Gooding, State ofidaho.
- 2.

During the past nine years I have worked for the Gooding City Police Department as 1he
CSO, and for the past three years as a Patrol Officer I hold a Basic Certificate through Idaho
state POST.

3. Based upon my own observations and the observations of other law enforcement offici!r
involved in the subject investigation, this affidavit is made in support of an application. fo: a
search warrant.

4. On 11/02/2013 I Officer Thiemann with the Gooding City Police Department was
dispatched to 2210 California Street for an individual that had "broken into a

I
I

I
I
I

I
I
I
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residence.

5. Upon my arrival I could see Jeremy Larson know to me from orevious contacts. I
transported him to the Gooding County Jail. Before booking him into the jail I read him his
Miranda and asked him if he wanted to speak with me. He did, after speaking with him he
told me that he had taken the saw from 1306 ih Ave West in be county of Gooding.
Jeremy Larson told me that he had transported it to the residence located at 529 California
street in the city of Gooding.

6. I asked him why he had taken it there. He informed me that Ja.son Rowland the occupant of
the house told him that ifhe brought it to him he would give him $150.00.

7. I asked Jeremy when the last time he saw the chain saw in Jason house was. He told me that
he was over there on Halloween (10/31/2013) and he saw it then. I then asked ifhe had
anything else that was in the house that I needed to know about and he told me that thE:re
was drugs in the house.

8. I asked Jeremy how he knew that there were drugs in the house. Jeremy told me that Jason
Rowland had weighed Meth on a silver scale Halloween night. I asked how much he had
seen him weigh he said the scale said 6.2 he was unsure if it was ounces or grams. Jer,~my

I

also told me that he had seen Marijuana in the house during that same time as well

I
I

9. From the statements of Jeremy Larson about marijuana and meth being in the residenc·!

I
I

along with the stolen property Officer Thiemann your affiant believes there is probabk
cause to search the residence.

YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to search the above described premises and
persons for the property described above, TO SEIZE it if found and.to bring it promptly before the
court above named.
A copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken shall be given to the person from
whom or from premises property is taken. Ifno person is found in possession, a copy and receipt
shall be conspicuously posted at the place where the property is found or taken.
Return of this warrant is to be made to the above entitled cour1 within ten (10) days from the

I
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date thereof.
THIS WARRANT IS AUTHORIZED FOR NIGHTTIME SERVICE.
(WARRANT ISSUED AT

)
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GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 2_ day of

No
I
S};:frpv ,' G r~, t f

Yes
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

JASON EPHRIAM ROWLAND,

)
)

Case No. 2013-2398

Defendant.
)
______________
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
MOTION TO DISMISS

On February 27, 2013, the Defendant's Motion to Suppre:,s ,~ame on regularly for
hearing. The State was represented by Trevor Misseldine, Gooding County Deputy Prosecutor,
and the Defendant was present and represented by Counsel, Stacey Depew. The Court, having
considered the testimony, exhibits, briefs, and arguments of counsd, took the matter under
advisement for a written decision.

'
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL RISTO.RY

A search warrant was executed at the Defendant's residence on November 2, 2013 in the

I
I

evening. Officer Teresa Thiemann and Officer Justin Bekker testified at the motion to supp1-es~,
hearing. They participated in executing the search warrant.
Officer Thiemann was the first officer to make contact with the Defendant upon arriYing
at the residence. She was also the officer who signed an affidavit in support of the application for
the search warrant. The search warrant commanded the search of 529 California Street as well ai;

I
I

of persons for various property, including a chainsaw, drug paraphernalia, Methamphetamine,
and Marijuana.
Upon arrival, Thiemann went downstairs and found the Defendant in a bedroom. She
handcuffed him, escorted him up the stairs, and handed. him off to another officer outside the

I
I

door. Officer Bekker conducted the search prior to the Defendant's arrest. Officer Bekke~
testified that he was unsure whether the Defendant was merely being detained or had actuall~,
been arrested. A baggie with a white powdery substance was found in the Defendant's pocket.
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss on February 6, 2014.

II.

I
I

JUDICIAL NOTICE
At the request of the parties, the Court hereby takes judicial notice, pursuant to I.R.E.
201, of the Search Warrant filed November 4, 2013 and the Preliminary Hearing transcript from
November 21, 2013.

I
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III.
TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS
A. TESTIMONY
1. Teresa Thiemann

Teresa Thiemann testified at the motion to suppress hearing on February 27, 2014
regarding the events that occurred on November 2, 2013. Thiemann is a patrol officer with th1!
City of Gooding, and she has been employed by the Gooding City Police Department for 9 years.
On November 2, 2013, Thiemann issued and executed a search war.ant at the Defendant':;
residence. She knew it was the Defendant's residence because she has known the Defendant for
9 to 10 years, and he has always lived at the residence. Moreover, she had contact with th,:
Defendant at the residence approximately 2 to 3 weeks prior. The execution of the warranr
occurred in the evening while it was dark outside.
Upon arrival, some officers went to the front of the house, and some officers went to the
rear of the house. Thiemann secured a door on the side of the house. She heard footsteps imide
the house, and then she entered the house. The door opened up into a stairwell with stairs going
up and stairs going down. There was one room at the bottom of the stairs, and this room was
below ground. The stairs going up led to the main floor.
Thiemann went downstairs, and it took her approximately

J1)

s,econds to arrive at the

bottom of the stairs. It was dark, but she used a flashlight. The stairs were covered with various
items including clothing, stereos, wiring, tools, and other things. A computer tower was at the
top of the steps. Thiemann had to step on things as she walked downstairs, and it was noisy.
There were also items piled at the bottom of the stairs. She saw chainsaw parts and a case, and
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the chainsaw was one of the items listed in the search warrant. As :;he walked down the si:airs,
she yelled "search warrant."
Thiemann entered the bedroom at the bottom of the stairs and made contact witl:. the
Defendant. Upon making contact with the Defendant, she asked him 1:0 place his hands in the air.
He complied, and then she asked him to place his hands behind his back. After she handcuffed
him, she escorted him back upstairs and handed him off to a deputy. She told the deputy tha1 th,!
Defendant had not yet been patted down or checked for weapons. She testified that she told the
deputy to conduct a patdown of the Defendant. She did not actually see the deputy's face, but she
saw his arm and observed that he was in police uniform. The landing had items in it on the fbor,
so there was only enough room for one person to go through the door.
Thiemann testified that the Defendant was not under arrest at 1his point, as they were jusi:
securing everyone in the residence. She testified that she knew that they were going to arrest thE'
Defendant; however, he was not under arrest at that point. She knew he was going to be arrei:ted
because she stepped over the chainsaw that was described as stolen property in the search
warrant. He was only being detained at that point.
She then made contact with her supervisor and continued searching the residence. During
the search, she found drug paraphernalia, a white powdery substan:;e, and a green leafy
substance in an upstairs room.
Thiemann transported the Defendant to jail and told him he was under arrest for
possession of paraphernalia, possession of a white powdery substance, aid possession of stolen
property.
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2. Justin Bekker

Justin Bekker testified at the motion to suppress hearing on February 27, 2014 regarding
the events that occurred on November 2, 2013. Bekker is a reserve police officer with the
Gooding County Police Department. Bekker assisted with the ~:earch of the Defendant',
residence, and he testified that they found drug paraphernalia and stolen items.
Bekker was the third person to enter the house. He entered through the front door. He saw
two men, and he told them to lie down on the ground. He handcu:Ied the men and searched
them. He conducted what he referred to as a Terry search which involved taking everything ou:
of the pockets to be sure there was nothing that could hurt him.
After the inside of the house was secured, Bekker went outside. Another officer askec.
Bekker if he would pat down the Defendant or search him to make sure he did not have

ID)

weapons. Bekker was not present outside when Thiemann handed the Defendant over to another
officer. Bekker testified that he was unsure if the Defendant had been detained or had been
arrested, so he conducted what he referred to as a Terry search. Bekker interacted with the
Defendant for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Bekker felt the Defendant's belt and did not feel
anything metal. Bekker searched the Defendant and found money in his left front pocket, and he
found a clear bag with a white powdery substance inside it.
IV.
STANDARD

The 4th Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and St:izures and was applled
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). "[A]ll evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court." Id.
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Katz v. US protects the privacy of those that exhibit an actual expectation of privacy and
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that expectation is one that society is willing to accept as reasonable. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). An
unlawful search and seizure can only occur where the defendant has

3.

reasonable expectatio1 of

privacy. Id at 360. Vehicles have a reduced expectation of privac:r. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590 (1974). "Warrantless searches are deemed to be 'per sc unreasonable' and the
burden is upon the state to demonstrate that the search was carried out pursuant to one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 21)9, 214, 677 P.2d 522 '.Ct
App. 1984).

II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of \\itnesses, resolve fac·:uaJ
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in tht! trial court." Stat(: v.
LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 243 P.3d 1093 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Veldez-MoLna,
127 Idaho 102,106,897 P.2d 993 (1995)). On appeal, "[t]he standard of review ofa suppression
motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the court of
appeals] accept[s] the trial court's findings of fact that are supporte:l 1:y substantial evider.ce,
but ... freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles tc, the facts as found." Id.
(citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561,926 P.2d 1284 (Ct. App. 1996)).

v.
ISSUE

1. Should evidence obtained as a result of the search of the Defendant':; person be suppressed?
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VI.

ANALYSIS
The Defendant argues that this Court should suppress all evidence seized from him and

I

all of the fruits of the warrantless search and seizure of him. (M,)t. to Suppress & Mot. to
Dismiss 1).
The State argues that there are three justifications for the 1;earch of the Defendart. It
argues that the search of the Defendant was valid as a search inciden-: to arrest. Second, the mate
argues that the Defendant is incorrect in its argument that a person ccnniJt be searched during the

I

execution of a search warrant, and the search warrant in this particular ,;ase included a search of
the Defendant. Third, the Defendant would have been arrested for possessing the s·:okn
chainsaw; therefore, under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, the drugs and paraphernalia
would have been found on the Defendant's person.
The Defendant argues that there cannot be a valid search inc:idmt to arrest because there
were no grounds to arrest him in the first place. He asserts that nothing tied him to the Etol1~n
items, so there was no valid reason for his arrest prior to the offict:r's search of his person and
discovery of drugs and paraphernalia. He maintains that there were three other people in fae
house, and there was nothing that tied him directly to the stolen items. He argues that since
Officer Thiemann indicated that she knew they were going to arres : him, then the officers knew
they were going to arrest him prior to their arrival at the residence. Therefore, they could have
obtained an arrest warrant for the Defendant. Moreover, the doctrine of inevitable discovery dc,es
not apply because the arrest was invalid.
The evidence does not indicate that the officers knew that they were going to am,st 1he
Defendant prior to the officers' entry into the evidence. The evidence is to the contrary. Offfoer
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Thiemann testified that she knew that the Defendant was going to be arrested becaus~ she
stepped over the chainsaw that was described as stolen property in the: search warrant. Ste dd
not testify that she knew she was going to arrest the Defendant prior to entering the residence.

I

Moreover, Officer Bekker testified that when he first made contact vvith the Defendant he did not
know whether the Defendant had been arrested or whether the Defendant was merely being
detained. This suggests that at least Officer Bekker did not believe that they were definitely
going to arrest the Defendant prior to their entry into the residence.
The search warrant specifically mentions the Defendant. Officer Thiemann, in her sworn
affidavit, stated that Jeremy Larson informed her that he took the stolen chainsaw to the
Defendant's house. Larson told Thiemann that the Defendant offerc!d -:o pay him $150.00 if he
took the chainsaw to 529 California Street in Gooding, Idaho. The chainsaw was described in the
warrant as a Stihl chainsaw that was orange and white in color with a1 orange case. The i:erial
number was also included in the search warrant.
The search warrant authorized a search of 529 California Street as well as a search of the
Defendant's person for the items described in the warrant which included the chainsaw,
Methamphetamine, Marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. 1
The officers had probable cause to arrest the Defendant, and this probable cause 2rose
once Thiemann saw the chainsaw as described in the search warrant. "To determine whethe:r an
officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrei:t
and then decide whether those historical facts amount to probable cause." State v. Gibson, 141
Idaho 277, 282, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 2005). If a person has ccmrnitted a public offern;e i1
the presence of an officer, then a police officer can make a warrantlcss arrest of that person. Id.

1
The Search Warrant authorized law enforcement to " .. . search the above described premises and persons for th,:
property described above, .. . "

I
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Information that leads a person of ordinary care and prudence to belkve that a suspect is guilty is
information that gives rise to probable cause. Id. A court will rev.eVv the facts known tc the
officers at the time of the arrest, and the facts are viewed from an C1bjective viewpoint. Id. The
state has the burden of proving that based upon the totality of the circumstances, a warrantlei:s

I
I

I

arrest was valid. Id. at 283, 430.
The officers had probable cause to arrest the Defendant. The Defendant does not argi.e
that the search warrant is invalid. Based upon the search warrant, the officers had probable cam:e
to arrest the Defendant after discovering the chainsaw. The search wanant indicated that Larsen

i

I

told Thiemann that he stole a chainsaw and took it to the Defendant because the Defendant
offered to pay Larson $150.00 for it. Larson told Thiemann that he took the chainsaw to 5~9
California Street in Gooding. Based on this information and Thiernann's discovery o:: the
chainsaw on the stairs, a person of ordinary care and prudence would believe that the Defenda1t
was guilty of possessing the stolen chainsaw.
"Searches incident to arrest are one of the well-established exceptions to the warra1t
requirement." State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 838, 103 P.3d 448,451 (2004). Police are allowed
to search an arrestee's person after an arrestee is lawfully arrested. Ia:
So long as the search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous,
and the fruits of the search are not required to estal::lish probable
cause for the arrest, the search need not precisely foLow the arrest
in Idaho to be incident to that arrest. Probable cause for arrest, of
course, is a predicate for either a search or arrest.
State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 304, 688 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Ct. App. 1984).

"In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the
United States Supreme Court addressed this question in regard to the warrantless search of a
person. The Court held that a suspect need not be formally arrested prior to a search of his or h~r
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person as long as probable cause for the suspect's arrest existed at the time of the search. id. at

fj

substantially contemporaneous, and the fruits of the search are not required to establish probable

111, 100 S.Ct. at 2564-65, 65 L.Ed.2d at 645-46. So long as the search and the arrest ar~

cause for the arrest, the search need not precisely follow the arrest ir. order to be incident to that

I
I
I
I
I

arrest. State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656,662, 51 P.3d 1112, 1118 (Ct.App.2002)." State v. Smith,
152 Idaho 115,119,266 P.3d 1220, 1224 (Ct. App. 2011).
The search of the Defendant was a valid search incident to arrest. Although the searc:h of
the Defendant's person occurred prior to his formal arrest, it occurred within a short peric,d of
time of his arrest. Furthermore, the initial reason for his arrest wa:; h:ls possession of a stolen
chainsaw and not because of anything found on his person. The searc:h of the Defendant's pc:rson
and his arrest were substantially contemporaneous. The fruits of the i:earch of the Defendant. that

;

is the white powdery substance, was not required to establish probable cause for the arrest. The

'

probable cause for the arrest had been established prior to the disc,Jvery of the white powde1y
substance and was based upon the possession of the stolen chainsaw. Therefore, the search prior
to his arrest was valid.
VII.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Suppress and Moton to Dismiss are
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

//

day of

VUa [t-iL 2014.

~2'...tl~J~-"--?-
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CERTIF!CA TE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

/J.?a,·ch

,

I, undersigned, hereby certify that on the Jj_ day of
2014, a 1rue
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND MOTION TO DISMISS was mailed, pmtage paid, and/or handdelivered to the following persons:
Trevor Misseldine
Gooding Deputy Prosecutor
P.O. Box 86
Gooding, Idaho 83330

Stacey DePew
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9
Jerome, Idaho 83338
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